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No. 78-561 
UNITED STATES Cert to CA. 8 
Vo 
NAFTALIN 
(Bright, Henley~ Ross 
dissenting in part) 
Federal/Criminal Timely (by ext.) 
1. SUMMARY: The issue in this case is whether§ 17(a)(l) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. § 77q(a) (1), proscribes fraud where the 
.. --
victim of such activity is a broker rather than an investor. 
2. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: Resp is the principal in a registered 
broker-dealer firm. This case involves a . "short selling" scheme. Resp 
placed orders to sell stocks for the firm's account which the firm did 
not own. He rnisrep.)?€"5ented the firm as being "long" in the particular 
--£ wov\d c;Av:,cu~~ wr\h a "'._.., -\uw..-.:1 __:r~~ 
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stockso Under SEC regulations a broker may execute an order to sell 
a customer's shares immediately upon request if the seller owns the 
security ordered to be sold and will deliver the security as soon as 
possible. Resp was gambling that there would be a swift decline in the 
I ' 
stocks' prices, enabling him to buy back the stocks necessary to cover th 
(' l . · .. 
transaction while realizing a profit. The market did not cooperate. 
The stock prices rose and resp was unable to deliver the securities that 
he had promised. ~ brokers who made the sales for resp lost roughly 
$1,000,000. Resp was indicted and convicted for violations of§ 17(a) 
(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
The CA 8 reversed. It conceded that resp had acted fraudulently, 
but concluded that the government must show some fmpact on an investor 
(
in order to make out a case under§ 17(a) (1). It characterized that 
section as solely an attempt to "protect investors from fraudulent 
practices in the sale of securities." App. at 6a-7a. Since resp' s 
fraud injured brokers rather than investors, the CA held that his 
culpability could not be premised on that section. The CA also reversed 
resp's conviction on the sixth count of the indictment, Judge Ross 
dissenting, although that count involved fraud on a broker who traded 
on his own account as an investor. It held that the indictment did 
not allege that the defrauded broker was a purchaser. The SG disagrees 
with the disposition of count 6, but states that the holding is limited 
~ to the facts of this case and therefore he does not seek review of that 
disposition here. 
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3o CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that theCA's holding "effectively 
removes federal criminal prohibitions against fraudulent securities 
schemes in which the fraudulent statements are made to financial insti-
tutions serving as intermediaries in securities transactions.'' Petn at 
6. He contends that this result is inconsistent with the plain language 
of the statute. 
Section 17 (a) (1) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce or by the use of 
the mails, directly or indirectly --
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud. • • • 
By its terms the section applies to all fraudulent practices 
11 
in the offer 
or sale of any securities. 11 An offer is defined in § 2 (3) of the 1933 
Securities Act as "every attempt or offer to dispose of • • • a security 
. . • for value. 11 The SG contends that here resp placed sell orders 
for value with various brokers and employed a scheme to defraud in the 
course of placing those orders. He concludes that resp's conduct is 
squarely covered by the Act. Since hothing on the face of the statute 
limits its coverage to fraud on investors, it should not be read so 
restrictively by the courts. He adds that this Court has often held 
that the securities laws should be interpreted broadly to effectuate 
their remedial purposes. ~, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
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The SG adds that what happened here can be construed as fraud 
against investors. A loss to investors is averted in cases such 
as this by the securities regulation which requires brokers to "buy in" 
realJhares to deliver to the buyer who agreed to purchase. The buyer 
therefore has the shares he contracted for before the seller actually 
delivers the securities to the broker. The brokers therefore effectively 
insure their customers against loss. That investors are insured against 
loss from fraud does not, according to the SG, mean that they are not 
the victims of fraud. And like an insurance company, the brokers will 
ultimately pass their losses on to their customerso 
Resp observes that if theCA's opinion is likely to have the 
dramatic consequences suggested by the SG, it is indeed strange that 
this case is the only one of its type in the 45 years of the '33 Act. 
The government lost this case because of a pleading mistake: the SEC 
relied on 17(a) instead of§ 10-b and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. There 
have been successful prosecutions of sim'ilar conduct under § 10-b. 
United States v. Pelz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970). This case is over 
nine years old and of nothing but limited historical interest. Moreover, 
the SEC has authority under§ lO(a) of the 1934 Act to promulgate rules 
for the purpose of regulating short sales.Resp argues that theCA's 
statutory interpretation is correct and fortified by the maxim that 
criminal statutes are to be read narrowly. 
4. DISCUSSION: TheCA's reading of§ 17(a) does seem unduly 
restrictive, and the authority relied on by the CA to bolster its inter----------
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pretation is extremely weak. They cite FDR's message to Congress 
describing the purpose of the '33 Act as "protect[ing] the public with 
the least possible interference to honest business." At root theCA's 
position rests on a questionable reading of the statute and the maxim 
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. 
TheCA 8's opinion is also inconsistent with the position taken 
by theCA 2 in United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336 {1977), where con-
spirators counterfeited the stock of a corporation and exchanged the 
bogus stock with the corporation's transfer agent for real stock 
certificates of smaller denominations. The latter stock was then placed 
in a trading account and sold to and through New York brokerage houses. 
Brown appealed his conviction under§ 17(a), arguing that that section 
was inapplicable because the scheme here was to defraud the transfer 
agent -- Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and not investors, who 
received legitimate securities. The CA rejected the argument: 
While this court has noted that the primary purpose 
of the 1933 Act was to protect investors, • • • 
appellant has not cited and we have not found any 
case holding that this was its sole purpose and 
that unless the ultimate purchaser of securities 
is injured or defrauded the criminal provisions 
of§ [17(a)] are not violated. The language of 
that section • • • broadly condemns the employment 
of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" 
or the engagement "in any transaction, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
There can be no doubt that there was established 
on trial a device, scheme or artifice to defraud. 
* * * 
[T]here is no doubt that Congress in the 
broad language employed in§ [17(a)] was intent 
- 6 -
upon protecting the integrity of the marketplace 
in which securities are traded '. 
~th parties apparently argue that§ 10~) of the 1934 Act reaches 
resp's conduct, although there are only a few cases on point. ~, 
A,T, Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (CA 2 1967) (lOb-S 
governs although victim-stockbroker not "investor"); United States v. 
Pelz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970). The SG is concerned, however, that 
given the similarity in language between§ lO(b) of the '34 Act and 
§ 17(a) of the '33 Act, theCA 8's interpretation may have an adverse 
impact on lO(b) prosecutions. The relevant language in§ 17(a) is fraud 
"in t~e offer or sale of any securities. 11 Section 10 (b) is concerned 
with manipulations or deception 11 in connection with the purchase or sale. '' 
The difference in wording is a fine distinction on which to build 
different theories on the scope of protection. 
There is a response, 
11/29/78 
CMS 
Haar CA op in petn. 
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Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-561 
United States, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Appeals 
Neil T. Naftalin. for the Eighth Circuit. 
[May - , 1979] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether § 17 (a)(1) 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a)(1) , pro-
hibits frauds against brokers as well as investors. We hold 
that it does. 
Respondent, Neil Naftalin , was the president of a regis-
tered broker-dealer firm and a professional investor. Between 
July and August of 1969, Naftalin engaged in a fraudulent 
"short selling" scheme. He selected stocks that, in his judg-
ment, had peaked in price and were entering into a period of 
market decline. He then placed with five brokers orders to 
sell shares of these stocks, although he did not own the shares 
he purported to sell. Gambling that the price of the securi-
ties would decline substantially before he was required to 
deliver them, respondent planned to make off~tting purchases 
through other brokers a.t lower prices. He intended to take 
as profit the difference between the price at which he sold and 
the price at which he· covered. Respondent was aware, how-
ever, tha.t had the brokers who executed his sell orders known 
that he did not own the securities, they either would not have 
accepted the orders, or would have required a margin deposit. 
He therefore falsely represented that he owned the shares he 
directed them to selJ.l 
1 A broker may mark an order to sell a customer's shares "long" if he· 
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Unfortunately for respondent, the market . prices of the 
securities he "sold" did not fall prior to the delivery date, but 
instead rose sharply. He was unable to make covering pur-
chases, and never delivered the promised securities. Conse-
quently, the five brokers were unable to deliver the stock 
which they had "sold" to investors, and were forced to borrow 
stock to keep their delivery promises. Then, in order to 
return the borrowed stock, the brokers had to purchase re-
placement shares on the open market at the now higher prices, 
a process known as "buying in." 2 While the investors to 
whom the stocks were sold were thereby shielded from direct 
injury, the five brokers suffered substantial financial losses. 
The United States District Court for the District of Min· 
nesota found petitioner guilty on eight counts of employing 
"a scheme and artifice to defraud" in the sale of securities, 
in violation of § 17 (a) (1).~ App. ~4-25; App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 15a-20. Although the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit found the evidence sufficient to establish that re-
spondent had committed fraud , 579 F. 2d 444, 447 (1978), 
it nonetheless vacated his convictions. Finding that the pur-
pose of the Securities Act "was to protect investors from 
fraudulent practices in the sale of securities," id., at 447, the 
Court held that "the government must prove some impact of 
the scheme on an investor," id., at 448. Since respondent's 
fraud injured only brokers and not investors, the Court of 
"is informed that the seller owns the security ordered to be sold and, as 
soon as possible without undue inconvenience or expense, will deliver the 
security .... " 17 CFR § 240.10a-1 (d) (1978). 
2 If a broker executes a sell order marked "long" and the seller fails to 
deliver the securities when due, under certain circumstances the broker 
must "buy in" substitute ~ecmities. See 17 CFR § 240.10a- 2 (a) (1978) . 
See also 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1233-1235 (2cl eel . 1961) (here-
inafter Loss) . 
3 Willful violations of § 17 (a) are made subject to criminal sanctions by 
§ 24 of the Secur~ties Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77x . 
. ! • 
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Appeals concluded that Naftalin did not violate § 17 (a) (1), 
We granted certiorari, - U. S.- (1978) , and now reverse. 
I 
Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, subsection (1) 
of which respondent was found to have violated, states : 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or 
sale of any securities by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in inter· 
state commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or 
indirectly-
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud , or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omis· 
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or 
" ( 3) to engage in any transaction , practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
In this Court, N aftalin does not dispute that, by falsely rep-
resenting that he owned the stock he sold, he defrauded the 
brokers who executed his sales. Brief for Respondent 7-8, 
11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. He contends, however, that the 
Court of Appeals correctly held tha.t § 17 (a)(1) applies solely 
to frauds directed against investors, and not to those against 
brokers. 
Nothing on the fact of the statute supports this reading of 
it. Subsection ( 1) makes it unlawful for "any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities ... directly or indirectly .. . 
to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... " 
(Emphasis added.) The statutory language does not require 
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that the victim of thf' fraud be an investor-only that the 
fraud occur "in" an offer or sale. 
An offer and sale clearly occurred here. Respondent placf'd 
sell orders with the brokers; the brokers. acting as agents. 
executed the orders; and the r('sults were contracts of sale. 
which are within the statutory definition, 15 U.S. C.~ 77h (3). 
Moreover, the fraud occurred "in" the "offer" and "sale." 1 
The statutory terms, which Congress expressly intended to 
define broadly, see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess .. 11 
(1933); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 512 n. 163 (2d eel., 
1961) (hereinafter Loss); cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 
393 U. S. 453. 467 n. 8 (1969). arc expansive enough to en-
compass th(' entire selling pmcess. inc] uding the seller I agent 
trausaction. Section 2 (3) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), 
states : 
"The term 'sale' ... shall include every contract of sale 
or disposition of a security or interest in a Sf'Curity. for 
value. The term ... 'offer' shall include every attempt 
or offer to dispose of ... a security or interest in a secu-
rity, for value." (Emphasis added.) 
This language does not require that the fraud occur in any 
particular phase of the selling transaction. At the very least, 
an order to a broker to sell securities is certainly an "attempt 
to dispose" of them. 
Thus, nothing in subsection ( 1) of § 17 (a) creates a re· 
4 Respondent contends that the requiremrnt that the fraud be "in" 
the offer or sale connotes a narrower range of activities than does the 
phrase "in connection with," which is found in § 10 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b). First, we are not neces,;arily 
persuaded that "in" is narrower than "in connection with." Both Con-
gress, see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933), and this 
Court, see Supt. of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 
10 (1971), have on occasion used the terms interchangeably. But even 
if "in" were meant to connote a narrower group of transactions than "in 
connection with," there is nothing to indicate that "in" is narrower in the 
sense in,;isted upon by Naftalin. 
I I .• ~, I J • • 
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quirement that injury occur to a purchaser. Respondent 
nonetheless urges that the phrase, "upon the purchaser," 
found only in subsection (3) of § 17 (a), should be read into 
all three subsections. The short answer is that Cougress did 
not write the statute that way. Indeed, the fact that it did 
not provides strong affirmative evidence that while impact 
upon a purchaser may be relevant to prosecutions brought 
under§ 17 (a)(3), it is not required for those brought under 
§ 17 (a) ( 1). As is indicated by the use of the infinitive "to" 
to introduce each of the three subsections, and the use of the 
conjunction "or" at the end of the first two. each subsection 
proscribes a distinct category of misconduct.5 Each succeed~ 
ing prohibition is meant to cover additional kinds of illegali-
ties-not to narrow the reach of the prior sections. See 
United States v. Birrell, 266 F. Supp. 539. 542-543 (SDNY 
1967). There is, therefore, "no warrant for narrowing alter. 
native provisions which the legislature h~ts adopted with the 
purpose of affording added safeguards." United States v. Gil. 
liland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941).0 
II 
The court below placed primary reliance for its restrictive 
interpretation of § 17 (a) (1) upon what it perceived to be 
5 Moreover, while matters like "punctuation [are] not decisive of the 
construction of a sta tute," Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341, 344 
(1932), where they reaffirm conclusions drawn from the words themselves 
they provide useful confirmation. Here the use of separate number~ to 
introduce each subsection, and the fact that the phrase "upon the pur-
chacSer" was set off solely as part of subsection (3), confirm our con-
clusion that "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional 
intent. to limit its coverage," United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 373 
(1978), to frauds against purchasers. 
6 This case involves a criminal prosecution. The decision in Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (197fi), which limited to 
purchasers or sellers the class of plaintiffs who may bring private implied 
causes of action under SEC Rule lOb-5, is therefore in applicable. See 
SEC v. Natio11al Securities) Inc ., 393 U.S. 453, 467 n. 9 (1969). 
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Congress' purpose in passing the Securities Act. Noting that 
both this Court and Congress have emphasized the importance 
of the statute in protecting investors from fraudulent prac-
tices in the sa.Ie of securities, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U. S. 185, 195 (1976), the Court of Appeals concluded 
that "against this backdrop ... we are constrained to hold that 
the government must prove some impact of the scheme on ai} 
investor." 579 F. 2d, at 448. 
But neither this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that 
investor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities Act. 
As we have noted heretofore, the Act "emerged as part of the 
aftermath of the market crash in 1929." Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, supra, at 194. See generally 1 Loss 120- 121. 
Indeed, Congress' primary contemplation was that regulation 
of the securities markets might help set the economy on the 
road to recovery. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2925 (remarks of Rep. 
Kelly); id., at 2935 ( rema.rks of Rep. ,Chapman); id., at 3232 
(remarks of Sen. Norbeck); H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 2 (1933). Prevention of frauds against investors was 
surely a key part of that program, but so was the effort '~to 
achieve a high standard of business ethics ... in every facet 
of the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 
U. S. 180, 186- 187 (1963) (emphasis added). See Ernst & 
Ernst v. H ochfelder, supra, at .~95; United Sta;tes v. Brown, 
555 F. 2d 336, 338-339 (CA2 1977). . .. 
This conclusion is amply supported .by reference .to the .leg-
.islative record. The breadth of Congress' purpose is most 
. • 0 ' l • 
clearly demonstrated by the Senate.Repo~t : · 
I I ''" 
"The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing 
public and honest business. . . . The aim is to prevent 
further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, 
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepre .. 
sentation; to place adequate and true information before 
the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital 
~ by ho1~~st JJ,r.e~ent~tion , against the competition afforded 
~' . ' ~, I, ' I • <.: .: 
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by dishonest securities offered to the public through 
crooked promotion ; to restore the confidence of the 
prospective investor in his ability to select sound securi-
ties; to bring into productive channels of industry and 
development capital which has grown timid to the point 
of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and 
restoring buying and consuming power." S. Rep. No. 47, 
73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1933) (emphasis added) . 
'While investor protection was a constant preoccupation of the 
legislators, the record is also replete with references to the 
desire to protect ethical businessmen. See 77 Cong. Rec. 
2925 (remarks of Rep. Kelly); id., at 2983 (remarks of Sen .. 
Fletcher); id., at 3232 (remarks of Sen. Norbeck); S. Rep. 
No. 47, 73d Cong .. 1st Ses .. 1 (1933). As Representative 
Chapman stated. " [ t] his legislation is designed to protect not 
only the investing public but at the same time to protect 
honest corporate business." 77 Cong. Rec. 2935. 
It is obvious why Congress would want to protect both 
investors and financial intermediaries, for the welfare of the 
two are inextricably linked-frauds perpetrated upon either 
business or investors can rPdound to the detriment of the other 
and to the economy as a whole. See generally SEC, Report 
of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. 
No. 95, pt. 1, 88th Cong. , 1st Sess., 9- 11 (1963). Fraudulent 
short sales are no exception.7 Although investors suffered no 
immediate financial injury in this case because the brokers 
covered the sales by borrowing and then "buying in," the 
indirect impact upon investors may be substantial. "Buying 
in" is in actuality only a form of insurance for investors and, 
like all forms of insurance, has its own costs. Losses suffered 
by brokers increase their cost of doing business, and in 
the long run investors pay at least part of this cost through 
higher brokerage fees. Moreover, unchecked short sale frauds 
1 It bears repeating that respondent was not convicted for short selling, 
but for fraudulent short selling. 
78-561-0PINION 
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against brokers would create a level of market uncertainty 
that could only work to the detriment of both investors and 
the market as a whole. Finally, while the investors here were 
shielded from direct injury, that may not always be the case. 
Had the brokers been insolvent or unable to borrow, the 
investors might well have failed to receive their promised 
shares. Entitled to receive shares at one price under the 
purchase agreement. they would have had to buy substitute 
shares in the market at a higher price.8 Placing brokers out-
side the aegis of § 17 (a) would create a loophole in tpe stat-
ute that Congress simply did not intend to create. 
III 
Although the question was not directly presented in the 
Government's Petition for Certiorari, respondent asserts a 
final, independent argument in support of the judgment 
below. That assertion is that the Securities Act of 1933 was 
"preoccupied with'·' the regulation of initial public offerings 
of securities, and that Congress waited until the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate abuses in the trading of 
securities in the "aftermarket." As Na.ftalin's fraud did not 
involve a new offering. he contends that § 17 (a) is inapplica-
ble, and tha.t he should have been prosecuted for violations 
of either the specific short selling regulations promulgated 
under the 1934 Act,9 or for violations of the general antifraud 
8 Although this potential for immroiatc financial injury to investors has 
been reduced by the "buy in" regulations, see 17 CFR § 240.10a-2 (1978), 
as well as by the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 
1970, see 15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq., the potential for indirect injury, 
described supra, still remains. Moreover, the:;;e legal requirements did not 
exist when the 1933 Act was pas;;ed, and hence at H1at time the kind of 
fraud practicE'<~ by respondent might well have caused investors direct 
financial injury. The :-~uhsequent enactments do not serve to re:-~tricl the 
original ~cope of § 17 (a). 
9 See 15 U. S.C. §§ 78g, 78j (a); 12 CFR §§ 220.3, 220.4 (c) (ii), 220 .. S · 
(d), 224.2 (1978); 17 CFU §240.10a-1 (1978). 
ll : 
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proscriptions of the 1934 Act's §lOb, 15 U.S. C.§ 78j (b), and 
the SEC's Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1978). Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 17- 18; Brief for Respondent 16-17, 22- 24. 
Although it is true that the 1933 Act was primarily con-
cerned with the regulation of new offerings, respondent's 
argument fails because the antifraud prohibition of § 17 (a) 
was meant as a major departure from that limitation. Unlike 
much of the rest of the Act, it was intended to cover any 
fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in 
the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary 
market trading. 1 Loss 130; Douglas & Bates, The Federal 
Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L. J. 171, 182 (1933); V. 
Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance 740 (1972). 
This is made abundantly clear both by the statutory language, 
which makes no distinctions between the two kinds of trar1s" 
actions, and by the Senate Report, which stated: 
"The act subjects the sale of old or outstanding secu" 
rities to the same criminal penalties and injunctive au" 
thority for fraud, deception, or misrepresentation as in 
the case of new issues put out after the approval of the 
act. In other words, fraud or deception in the sale of 
securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether the 
security is old or new. or whether or not it is of the class 
of securities exempted under sections 11 or 12." S. Rep. 
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1933). 
Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933). 
Respondent is undoubtedly correct that the two Acts prohibit 
some of the same conduct. See 3 Loss 1428. But "[t]he 
fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual 
nor unfortunate." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S., 
at 468. See Edwards v. United States, 312 U. S. 473, 484 
(1941). It certainly does not absolve Naftalin of guilt for 
the transactions which violated the statute under which he 
was convicted. 
78-561-0PINION 
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IV 
This is a criminal case, and we have long held that " 'am-
biguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity,' " United States v. Culbert, 435 
U. S. 371, 379 (1978) , quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 
U. S. 808, 812 (1971) , and that a defendant may not "'be 
subjected to a penaity unless the words of the statute plainly 
impose it,' " United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U. S. 293, 
297 (1971) , quoting Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U.S. 
356, 362 (1905). See Dunn v. United States,- U. S. - , 
- (1979) (slip op., at 12). In this case, however, the words 
of the statute do "plainly impose it." Here, "Congress has 
conveyed its purpose clearly, and we decline to manufacture 
ambiguity where none exists," United States v. Culbert, supra. 
';J.'he decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is 
Reversed, 
May 8, 1979 
78-561 u.s . v . Naftalin 
Dear Bill: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case . 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 




' • · · r 
~ . ~ ... 
u.p-uutt QJourt oJ t4.t 'Jllttittb .§htttg 
~1tslyhtgtcn.l9. QJ. ~!l.?Jl..;t 
C .HAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKM U N 
Re: 78 - 561 - United Sta t e s v. Naftalin 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
., 
May 8, 1979 
.:§u;n-.tttt.t <!fottrl of tlr.t ~~;§taUs 
~Mfringtelt. ~. Qf. 2ll.;TJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE May 9, 1979 
Re: No. 78-561 - United States v. Naftalin. 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
~tqtrtntt <!)'ltttrl of tltt 'J!lttittb ~tl:lftil 
'Basqingwn. ~. QJ. 2llpJ~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 9, 1979 
Re; No. 78-561 - United States v. Naftalin 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me, 
Sincerely, 
T.M, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~uvrmtt <!}Llltrl c-f fltt~b ~hrlu 
~ItS' Jrtttgic:n:. ~. <!J. 2llbiJ!. ~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 9, 1979 
Re: No. 78-561, United States v .. Naftalin 
Dear Bi 11, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
~.~·, 
/ 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
..§nprtttU <!fttttrl ttl t£rt ~tb ~faUg 
jiaa:frhtgLttt. ~. <!f. ZIT?~~ 
/ 
May 11, 1979 
Re: No. 78-561 - United States v. Naftalin 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, / 
· vr· 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
.. 






















I I I 
